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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARCHIE CLARENCE PACE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 14542
BROOKFIELD PRODUCTS, INC.
et al.,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF tlttl CASE

This is an action against Defendant-Appellant Brookfield
Products, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as defendant Brookfield)
atid others brought by Plaintiff-Respondent Archie Clarence Pace
(hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) seeking to foreclose on a
mortgage.

Defendant Brookfield counterclaimed against plaintiff

alleging plaintiff had acquired from but failed to pay defendant
Brookfield for certain merchandise.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The case came before Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
the Court granted plaintiff's Motion.

At the close of argument,

- 2 RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant Brookfield seeks to have plaintiff's
Summary Judgment set aside, the Court's decision reversed and the
case remanded for trial.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Plaintiff Archie Clarence Pace brought an action against
defendants Brookfield, Larry F. Pace (plaintiff's son) and Sharee
F. Pace (hereinafter referred to as defendants Pace) and Kamas
State Bank (hereinafter referred to as Bank), alleging that
defendants Pace had executed and delivered to plaintiff a promissory
note and mortgage and subsequently had defaulted thereon.
action was brought to foreclose on said mortgage.

Plaintiff's

Defendant

Brookfield and the Bank were named as parties to the action
because of their alleged lien and/or interest in the property
subject to the mortgage.
Defendant Brookfield answered denying each and every
paragraph of plaintiff's complaint and counterclaimed against
plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff had purchased and accepted
from defendant Brookfield certain merchandise, the cost of which
totaled $15,434-45, that plaintiff had failed to pay for said
merchandise, and that plaintiff was indebted to defendant Brookfield
in that amount.
Plaintiff answered said counterclaim alleging that any
amounts due defendant Brookfield from plaintiff had been satisfied

- 3and that there had been a complete accord and satisfaction.
Plaintiff later submitted interrogatories to defendant
Brookfield, the questions and answers to which are as follows:
1. List all documents known to exist by the
defendant, Brookfield Products, Inc., which show the
plaintiff owes the defendant Fifteen Thousand Four Hundred
Thirty-Four and 35/100 ($15,434.35) Dollars.
Sales delivery tickets.
2. Where are said documents? Give the name
and address of each person who has possession of any of
said documents.
Brookfield Products, Inc., 4700 South West
Temple, Murray, Utah.
3. Are the documents listed above in answer
to these interrogatories all of the proof the defendant
has of said debt? If there is other additional proof,
state what it consists of.
No. Testimony of Brookfield personnel.
Sales delivery tickets are proof the
defendant has.
4. List all payments received by the defendant,
Brookfield Products, Inc. on said account and answer the
following: (a) Date of payment; (b) By whom paid; (c) The
amount paid.
None.
5. Compute how the attorney's fees of Two
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-One and 78/100 ($2,251.78)
Dollars have been computed.
Bar schedule.
6. Has the defendant ever made demand for payment on the plaintiff?
Yes.
7. If answer to Interrogatory No. (6) is in
the affirmative then state the following:

- 4(a) When was said demand made?
(b) Who made said demand?
(c) By what means was said demand made? By
letter, personal contact, phone, etc.
Approximately one year and approximately
eight months ago. Howard Allen. Telephone.
8. If the answer to Interrogatory No. (6) is
negative then state why no demand was ever made on the
plaintiff for payment of the alleged accounts.
Not applicable.
Plaintiff then made a request for admissions from defendant
Brookfield, the questions and answers to which are as follows:
1. That the defendant, Brookfield Products,
Inc., has in its possession ledger cards or ledger sheets
showing charges, payments and balance on the Pace Account.
Admits paragraph 1 of Request for Admissions.
2. That defendant, Brookfield Products, Inc.
holds a mortgage with Ldrry C. Pace and Sharee F* Pace,
his wife, as mortgagors, said mortgage given to secure a
Promissory Note in the sum of Twenty-Nine Thousand
($29,000) Dollars, said note and mortgage bearing the date
of January 31, 1975.
The only reason defendant, Brookfield
Products, Inc., took the mortgage from
Larry C. Pace and Sharee F. Pace, his
wife, was because defendant, Larry C.
Pace, advised defendant, Brookfield
Products, Inc., he was securing a loan
to clear off the balance of the account,
which he failed to do; therefore, defendant,
Brookfield Products, Inc., felt it was
necessary to secure some kind of security
to try to force payment of the account.
3. That said note and mortgage for Twenty-Nine
Thousand ($29,000) Dollars includes the Fifteen Thousand
Four Hundred Thirty-four and 45/100 ($15,434.45) Dollars
which defendant, Brookfield Products, Inc., claims is
due them from the plaintiff.
On several occasions, defendant, Larry C.
Pace, and plaintiff, Archie Clarence Pace,

- 5requested defendant, Brookfield Products,
Inc., to give plaintiff, Archie Clarence
Pace, a release which defendant, Brookfield
Products, Inc., refused to do inasmuch as
defendant, Brookfield Products, Inc., knew
nothing of the contract between plaintiff,
Archie Clarence Pace and defendant, Larry
C. Pace.
4. That the ledger cards or sheets show that
the balance on the Archie Pace Account as of March 1, 1973,
of Fifteen Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-four and 45/100
($15,434.45) Dollars was continued in the name of Larry
Pace and that the purchases, payments and credits were continued forward from March 1, 1973 the same as they had been
prior to March 1, 1973.
See above answer to admission No. 2.
5. That on the theory of first in first out the
obligation claimed by defendant Brookfield Products, Inc.
has long since been paid and there is nothing due and owing
from the plaintiff to defendant Brookfield Products, Inc.
See above answer to admission No. 3.
Plaintiff, on the basis of the pleadings, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, brought a Motion for
Summary Judgment before the Court, arguing that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that plaintiff, as to
defendant Brookfield, on its counterclaim, was entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law,

The Court, after hearing the arguments

of counsel, granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as
prayed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRANSACTION AS DESCRIBED IN AND BASED UPON THE RECORD
IN THE CASE AT BAR DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION INASMUCH AS:

- 6A. THERE IS NOT AN OFFER WHICH WILL
SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED ACCORD
Plaintiff's theory of the case and evidently the basis
for the Courtfs granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
is that the securing by defendant Brookfield of a mortgage from
defendants Pace (plaintiff's son and daughter-in-law), under
the circumstances specified in the record, constituted an accord
and satisfaction, thereby releasing plaintiff from that indebtedness
which was owed defendant Brookfield prior to the alleged accord
and satisfaction.

If this is plaintiff's theory, those elements

necessary for the formation of an accord and satisfaction must be
satisfied.
The law concerning the formation of an accord and
satisfaction generally is that there can be no accord and satisfaction without the making of a new contract, one independent of and
additional to the source, contractual or otherwise, of the disputed
claim or claims.

1 Am Jur 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, §4. Utah

has adopted the general rule as is indicated in Ralph A. Badger &
Company v. Fidelity Building & Loan Association, 94 Utah 97,
75 P.2d 669 (1938).

In Badger, defendant issued a fifty-share

stock certificate to plaintiff's predecessor in interest, which
certificate was subsequently surrendered and reissued in two
twenty-five share certificates, one of which was acquired by
plaintiff.

Plaintiff's predecessor gave notice of intent to

withdraw the entire matured value of the shares to defendant and
this notice of intent to withdraw was deemed effective with

- 7regard to plaintiff's subsequently acquired twenty-five share
certificate.

Plaintiff alleged fraud, inter alia, in the

acquisition of the stock, and defendant pleaded accord and satisfaction.

The Court, on appeal, indicated that the principal

question was whether the evidence disclosed an accord and satisfaction and cited with approval the above rule found in Am Jur as
well as several Utah cases consistent with that rule.

The Court

concluded that there was no accord and satisfaction binding on
the plaintiff.
Defendant Brookfield would submit that the alleged
accord and satisfaction in the case at bar be carefully considered
to determine whether there was a new contract entered into, one
that was independent of and additional to the original obligation
between plaintiff and defendant Brookfield.

It is elementary to

the law of contracts that there must be an offer by one party and
that said offer "must be so definite in its terms.,.that the
promises and performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably
certain.11

Restatement of Contracts, §32 (1932).

Comment a. to

§32 of the Restatement further provides, "The law cannot subject
a person to a contractual duty or give another a contractual
right unless the character thereof is fixed by the agreement of
the parties."

There must be definiteness and certainty concerning

the subject matter in order for the proposal to be construed as
an offer.
In the case at bar, the record and specifically plaintiff's
Answer to Defendant Brookfield's Counterclaim indicates that the

- 8amount and value of the merchandise acquired by plaintiff from
said defendant is indefinite and uncertain, said defendant alleging
that plaintiff had purchased some $15,434.35 worth of merchandise
and the plaintiff admitting that some purchases were made, but
implying that not all of the alleged purchases were made.

In

order to have an effective accord, the subject matter of the
offer constituting the basis for the accord must be definite and
certain.

In the instant case, based on the present state of the

record, the subject matter, i.e., the amount and value of the
indebtedness, is indefinite and uncertain, and because of this
indefiniteness there is no effective offer and therefore no
accord.
B*

THERE IS NOT? AN ACCEPTANCE WHICH WILL
SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED ACCORD

In Corbin on Contracts, §1277, the author states:
No Accord and Satisfaction Without Expression
of Assent.
The process of making an accord, of interpreting the words and acts of the parties, and
of determining the legal effect thereof, is
the same as in the case of other contracts. In
order that a performance rendered by an obligor
shall operate as a satisfaction of the claim
against him, it must be offered as such to the
creditor. There must be accompanying expressions
sufficient to make the creditor understand, or
to make it unreasonable for him not to understand,
that the performance is offered to him as full
satisfaction of his claim and not otherwise. If
it is not so rendered, there is no accord, either
executory or executed, for the reason that there
are no operative expressions of agreement --no
sufficient offer and acceptance.

- 9The law generally is as stated by Corbin and found in
1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction, §3.a. wherein it is provided:
An accord is in essence a contract or agreement, and accord and satisfaction is found and
dependent on, and results from, a contract, express
or implied, between the parties, and occurs
only where the parties intend it and mutually
assent to it.
The essentials of valid contracts in
general must be present in a contract of accord
and satisfaction; there must be proper subject
matter, competent parties, an aggregatio
mentium, or meeting of the minds of the parties,
and, of course,...a proper consideration. The
contract must embody a definite offer of settlement, and an unconditional acceptance of such
offer according to its terms, and it must finally
and definitely close the matter covered by it,
so that nothing of or pertaining to that matter
is left unsettled, or open to further question
or arrangement. The act or acts to be done
under the contract must be specified with as
much cettainty as in any other agreement.
(Emphasis Added.)
In Harding Hotel Company v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company, 133 Wash. 272, 233 P. 276 (1925), plaintiff
Hotel entered into an agreement with the Tacoma Cabinet Works
whereby said cabinet company was to manufacture specified furniture
for the hotel.

Defendant became surety for any loss plaintiff

might incur due to a breach of contract by the cabinet company.
The furniture manufactured was defective, the cabinet company
became insolvent, and plaintiff offered to compromise its damages
by retaining the unpaid balance of price.

Subsequently, a bank,

as assignee of the cabinet company, commenced an action against
plaintiff seeking to recover the balance of the purchase price of
the furniture contract.

The plaintiff pleaded its damages as an

- 10 offset and prevailed.

As time passed, further defects of a

latent nature developed and plaintiff made demand for damages
against defendant.

Defendant contended that there had been an

accord and satisfaction, preventing plaintifffs recovery.

The

Court held that plaintiff's offer of compromise had never been
accepted and therefore no accord and satisfaction*
Based on the above, it seems abundantly clear that
there can be no accord and satisfaction without an unconditional
acceptance of the offer.
In the case at bar, defendant Brookfield indicated, in
its Answers to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions, that a mortgage
had been taken from defendants Pace (plaintiff's son) for the
reason that said defendants were securing a loan to satisfy the
outstanding accounts, and defendant Brookfield wanted an attempt
to insure satisfaction of said indebtedness by securing the
mortgage.

In said answers, defendant Brookfield further indicated

that on several occasions plaintiff and defendants Pace requested
that plaintiff be given a release from his indebtedness and that
defendant Brookfield look to defendants Pace therefor.

Defendant

Brookfield consistently, and on several occasions, refused to
release plaintiff from the indebtedness, and in fact, made continued
demands on plaintiff to pay the indebtedness; defendants Pace,
insofar as defendant Brookfield was concerned, merely became
joint obligors with plaintiff.

Defendant Brookfield did not

accept the proposed transfer of indebtedness from plaintiff to
defendants Pace and defendant Brookfield would submit a fortiori
without that expression of assent there was no accord.

- 11 C. THERE WAS NOT AN EXECUTION OF THE ACCORD
AND THEREFORE NO SATISFACTION
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that an accord was
reached between plaintiff and defendant Brookfield, said defendant
would submit that there has been no execution of the accord and
therefore no satisfaction.

In 1 Am Jur 2d, Accord and Satisfaction,

§47, it is stated:
The rule is universally recognized that
except where the new agreement is itself accepted
as a satisfaction, and except to the extent that
the rule has been changed by statute, the failure
to make a payment or otherwise perform an act
required by a new agreement entered into in
satisfaction of a debt or claim leaves such an
agreement a mere executory accord, without
satisfaction, and as such it constitutes no bar
to the enforcement of the original claim or debt.
Restatement of Contracts, §417 (1932), is consistent with the rule jus
stated and provides as follows:
...the
contract to
performance
contractual
(a)

following rules are applicable to a
accept in the futute a stated
in satisfaction of an existing
duty, or a duty to make compensation:

Such a contract does not discharge the
duty, but suspends the right to enforce
it as long as there has been neither a
breach of the contract nor a justification for the creditor in changing his
position because of its prospective
non-performance.
•k i< ic

(c)

If the debtor breaks such a contract
the creditor has alternative rights.
He can enforce either the original duty
or the subsequent contract.

In the case at bar defendant Brookfield alleges in its
Answer and Counterclaim that plaintiff purchased and accepted

- 12 from defendant Brookfield certain merchandise, the cost of which
totaled $15,434.45, that plaintiff had failed to pay for said
merchandise and that plaintiff was indebted to defendant Brookfield
for that amount.

Plaintiff, in its Answer to the Counterclaim of

Defendant Brookfield alleged satisfaction of any bills due and
owing defendant Brookfield between October of 1972 and March of
1973.

Plaintiff is not arguing in its Answer to Defendant

Brookfield1s Counterclaim that the mortgage herein referred to
was itself accepted as a satisfaction.

Plaintiff is arguing that

there was, in fact, a satisfaction of the indebtedness itself and
in light of the position taken by defendant Brookfield in its
Counterclaim where it is alleged that said indebtedness had not
been satisfied, a question of fact is raised.
Accordingly, defendant Brookfield would submit that
there has been no execution of th£ accord and therefore no satisfaction.
POINT II
THE PLEADINGS, ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES AND ADMISSIONS ON
FILE SHOW THAT THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL
FACTS AND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
...The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.

- 13 The following principles as specified in 6 Pt. 2 Moore's
Federal Practice 1f56.23, state generally the guidelines that
govern the granting of motions for summary judgment:
All reasonable doubts touching the existence
of a genuine issue as to material fact must be
resolved against the party moving for summary
j udgment.
It is not the function of the trial court
at the summary judgment hearing to resolve any
genuine factual issue, including credibility;
and for purposes of ruling on the motion all
factual inferences are to be taken against the
moving party and in favor of the opposing party,
and the appellate court will do likewise in
reviewing the trial court's grant of summary
judgment. Discretion plays no real role in the
grant of summary judgment; the grant of summary
judgment must be proper under the above principles
or the grant is subject to a reversal. The trial
court may, however, exercise a sound discretion
iri denyirig summary judgment, appropriate to the
case at hand, although the movant may have
technically shouldered his burden.
The Utah rule first above stated is not unlike the
federal rule for which Moore's principles have direct application;
indeed Moore's principles reflect the position taken by the Utah
Supreme Court in Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative,
11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 (1961), Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960), Thompson v. Ford
Motor Company, 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964), and Frederick
Mdy & Company v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962).
Without restating the facts and argument aforesaid,
defendant Brookfield would submit that there are many genuine
issues as to material facts in the case at bar.

The amount and

value of the merchandise acquired by plaintiff from defendant

- 14 Brookfield and as a corollary thereto what payments, if any, were
made by plaintiff or others toward the satisfaction of the
indebtedness, the question of whether or not there is any debt
owing, and the intent of defendant Brookfield in taking the
mortgage from someone other than the plaintiff Archie Clarence
Pace (in this case the mortgage, in fact, was taken from plaintiff's
son Larry G. Pace and daughter-in-law) are all genuine issues as
to material facts raised in the pleadings, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file.

Defendant Brookfield would

therefore submit that plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is not entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
CONCLUSION
the Trial Court, based on the pleadings, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, improperly granted
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and said judgment should
be set aside, the Court's decision should be reversed, and the
case should be remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
SIDNEY G.
THOMAS W.
Attorneys
1407 West
Salt Lake

BAUCOM
FORSGREN
for Appellant
North Temple
City, Utah 84110
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The foregoing Brief of Appellants was served on
Plaintiff-Respondent this 28th day of May, 1976, by mailing a
copy of same, postage prepaid, to his attorney, J. Harold Call,
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